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A Dialogue On Speeial Drawing Rights
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY MECH-
ANISM has been subjected to a series of shocks in
the last year; the devaluation of the British pound in
November 1967, the ensuing massive speculative pur-
chases of gold, the suspension of gold sales in the
London market by the Gold Pool Countries,’ and the
establishment of the two-price system for gold.2
The possibility of an international financial crisis
revolves around the fear that the international value
of the dollar and the pound sterling may be changed
in the future. As these currencies, along with gold,
are the present major sources of international reserve
assets, speculation on their devaluation would lead
some foreigners, both governmental and private, to
convert their dollar and sterling assets into gold or
some other commodity.
Such a shift in preferences against reserve curren-
cies could lead to a decline in the overall level of
international reserves. If this happened, it could result
in a decline in international trade and capital move-
ments, as various countries attempt to rebuild their
international reserve positions by taking restrictive
domestic actions or imposing exchange controls.
Given the apparently large private demand for
gold, and the firm intention of the United States
Government not to increase the price of gold, it is
clear that the future growth in international reserves
will not come from increased holdings of monetary
gold stocks. Increased foreign official holdings of
dollars, sterling, and automatic drawing rights on the
T
The Gold Pool countries were the United States, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and The
Netherlands, France was a member of the Pool earlier but
has not participated actively since June, 1967.
2The United States will continue to buy and sell gold to
foreign official institutions at a price of $35 an ounce; how-
ever, the private market price has been allowed to float.
International Monetary Fund could fill some of the
world’s need for increased international reserves.
However, the use of sterling as a reserve asset is
expected to decline substantially in the future. In
addition, the process of foreign acquisition of liquid
dollar balances, of necessity, implies continuation of
the United States international payments deficit. These
deficits have reduced foreign confidence in the value
of the dollar.
A mechanism, which in the process of generating
international reserves simultaneously reduces confi-
dence in the value of the reserve asset, is clearly in
need of some modification. It has been apparent for
some time that a supplemental form of reserve asset,
not subject to the limitations implicit in the use of a
national currency, is needed. SDR’s (Special Drawing
Rights of the International Monetary Fund) or paper
gold, as they are sometimes referred to, are the pro-
posed solution. After four years of discussion and
inquiry among interested governments, the general
outline of the SDR plan was approved by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund at its annual meeting at Rio
de Janefro, Brazil, in September 1967. During the sub-
sequent six months the staff of the IMF converted
this proposal into detailed language in the form of an
Amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement. This
detailed plan was accepted on the weekend of March
30-31, 1968, by monetary officials of the major IMF
member countries, ie, the Group of Ten,3 at a meeting
in Stockholm, Sweden.
This meeting was of critical importance because it
showed that there is strong agreement on the need to
create a supplemental form of international reserve.
3The Group of Ten are; Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
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Only France reserved its position with respect to
participating in the SDR plan. Ratification of the
SDR Amendments to the Articles of Agreement
requires the approval of 60 per cent of the member
countries with at least 80 per cent of the weighted
voting power. The United States was the first Govern-
ment to approve on June 24, 1968. However, because
of the legislative procedures involved in ratification
by the other member countries, it seems doubtful that
the new reserve facility will be activated before 1969.
Technical Issues
Question; What are Special Drawing Rights?
Answer; Special Drawing Rights (SDR’s) are ac-
count entries on the books of the International Mone-
tary Fund quite separate and distinct from the other
accounts of the IMF, which will be divided among
the Fund’s participating member countries in accord-
ance with their present IMF quotas. The member
countries will receive the initial allotment of SDR’s
without incuning a corresponding debit. A contingent
liability exists in case the SDR arrangement should
ever be terminated, or in case of the withdrawal of
one or more countries.
Question; What are the benefits to those countries
which participate?
Answer; Any country with SDR balances can use them
to meet balance-of-payments deficits with other coun-
tries. A country with a balance-of-payments deficit
usually has financed it by sales from its gold or con-
vertible currency holdings. With SDR’s, a country
can also finance part of its deficit by instructing
the IMF to draw down the balance in its SDR ac-
count in exchange for an equivalent amount of con-
vertible currency. The IMF then designates one or
more member countries to transfer convertible cur-
rency to the deficit country in exchange for an equi-
valent increase in SDR balances.
For example, if Japan had a $100 million deficit, it
could finance all or part of it from its SDR balances.
If the Japanese wish to utilize the equivalent of $50
million of their SDR account, the IMF would debit
Japan’s account for $50 million and credit the SDR
account of, for example, Germany, with a like amount.
Germany would transfer the equivalent of $50 million
in convertible currencies to Japan.
A country without a current balance-of-payments
deficit, or a declining level of international reserves,
may engage in voluntary transfers of SDR’s with an-
other country in order to restore a better balance in
the components of its international reserves. Such
action requires the mutual agreement of both par-
ticipating countries, and the approval of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. This provision is of special
importance to a reserve currency country like the
United States which has a substantial volume of out-
standing dollar liabilities to foreign central banks. A
member country holding more dollars than is con-
sidered appropriate can exchange them for SDR’s
with the United States, or with another country hold-
ing fewer dollars than it desires,
Countries which hold SDR’s will receive interest
on these balances at a rate to be decided by the
Board of Governors of the IMF, presently anticipated
to be 1½ per cent per year.
Question: \Vhat are the obligations of SDR participa-
tion?
Answer: There are basically two obligations to par-
ticipation in the SDR arrangement and they are con-
verse to the benefits. Just as countries with a deficit
can finance part of it by drawing down their SDR
holdings, countries with surpluses must be prepared
to accept part of the surplus in the form of SDR’s.
There is, however, a limit to the amount of SDR’s
which any one country must accept, equal to three
times the net cumulative allocation of SDR’s which
that country has received from the IMF inclusive of
these allocations. For example, if Italy’s share of the
net cumulative allocations is the equivalent of $10
million, it must be prepared to accept at least $20
million in additional SDR’s from other countries. A
country may, at its discretion, agree to accept a
larger amount of SDR’s.
Each country must pay a charge to the IMF on
its net cumulative allocations of SDR’s. The charge
will be equal to the interest rate paid on SDR’s. Thus,
those countries which hold only their net cumulative
issuance of SDR’s will have interest income and
charges which are equal to each other. Countries
whose SDR balance exceeds their net cumulative al-
locations (Germany in the example) will have interest
income which exceeds their charges. Countries with
SDR balances which are less than their net accmnula-
tive allocations (Japan in the example) will have
charges which exceed their interest income. Conse-
quently, there will be a small incentive for surplus
countries to acquire SDR balances and a small cost
for deficit countries to draw down their SDR balances.
Question; Must SDR balances be reconstituted?
Answer: This was one of the key questions in the
negotiation of the SDR arrangement. Some countries
wanted SDR’s to be fully repayable within a specified
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alent to intermediate-term financing much like con-
ventional type IMF financing. Other countries wanted
SDR’s to be permanently outstanding, which would
have made them, in effect, a net addition to the
stock of international reserves to the full extent of
the amount allocated. The final result was a com-
promise. Participating countries will be required to
maintain an average daily balance of SDR’s equal
to 30 per cent of their net cumulative allocation dur-
ing each “basic” period, which will be five years in
length. A country may reduce its SDR balance below
30 per cent at any time, but should have it rebuilt
by the end of the “basic” period in such a way that
the average daily balance is 30 per cent for the
“basic” period as a whole.
Question: What will prevent the issuance of SDR’s
from causing an international inflation?
Answer: The proposed amendment to the Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, to
determine the amount of SDR’s to be issued, specifies
such restrictive procedures that the major fear is that
too few, and not too many, SDR’s will be issued. An
85 per cent weighted vote of the members of the
IMF is required to initiate any issuance of SDR’s — a
minority group holding a fraction more than 15 per
cent of the votes can block any issuance.
Typically, those countries with balance-of-payments
surpluses are enjoying an increase in their holdings
of international reserves, and will probably require
substantial evidence of international deflation to con-
vince them that there is a world-wide shortage of
reserves. If surplus countries with a weighted voting
power of only 15.1 per cent are not convinced of
the need to increase international reserves, they could
veto any growth in SDR’s.
Question: What is the significance of the SDR plan?
An4wer: With gold no longer expected to contribute
to the growth in world monetary reserves, and with
the United States determined to correct its chronic
balance-of-payments problem in the near future, it is
essential that a supplementary reserve asset be de-
veloped. The implementation of the SDR plan will
provide the means for regulating the stock of inter-
national reserves through conscious decision-making,
according to the needs of world trade and capital
movements.
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